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The party had a long electioneering tradition...1
Research is needed to tell us why the CPSA was able to win
elections...2
Tom Lodge's request for research-based explanations of the
limited electoral successes of the Communist Party of South
Africa (CPSA) will not be adequately be addressed in this paper.
Instead, this paper will consider elements of the "long
electioneering tradition" of the CPSA, mostly its activities in
campaigns which its candidates did not win. Its focus will be
upon recently published information about the participation of
the CPSA in diverse electoral arenas during its twenty nine year
legal existence from 1921 to 1950. In conclusion, the usefulness
and limitations of the recently published information will be
assessed, suggesting directions for further research.
•The CPSA and South Africa's Segmented Electoral System
Electoral activity was never a central focus of the CPSA.
Its membership was more preoccupied with internal party
activities, strengthening trade unions, and, from the 1930s
onward, changing the stances of black national organizations in
which it was active. The CPSA was well aware that an
overwhelming majority of enfranchised voters were whites hostile
to its goals of marxist socialism and radical restructuring of
1
race relations. It equally recognised that electoral
opportunities for black voters were extremely limited and, where
they existed, offered little purchase for changing government
policies or practices.
As an electoral party the CPSA was unique among other pre-
1950s South African political parties in many ways -- and not
merely in its commitment to socialism, its identification with
the Soviet Union, and its opposition to racial discrimination.
It was the only political party open to all races, the only
political party concerned to mobilize blacks, and the only
political party whose prime focus was extra-parliamentary. It
was convinced that it had a vast potential constituency,
particularly among the unenfranchised majority of South Africans,
yet its own membership never was more than several thousand.
Nevertheless, the CPSA, like communist parties elsewhere in
Western European, North American, and Australasian parliamentary
systems, chose to utilize electoral channels to advance its
cause.
Unlike communist parties in other parliamentary systems, the
CPSA faced racially segmented electoral arenas. Both the right
to run for office and the franchise at all levels were limited
to whites in most areas of the country. Thus, in most elections
only white party members could present themselves as candidates
to predominantly white electorates. Blacks were either
explicitly barred from running or represented a minority of the
electorate. The notable exceptions were the segregated African-
only electoral arenas created by the Native Urban Areas Act of
1923 and the Native Representation Act of 1936 (see below).
At the national level only whites were eligible to run for
parliament and, after 1936, for provincial legislatures. Except
in urban municipalities in the Cape Province, only whites were
eligible for election to city councils. The other pre-1936
exception to the rule that only whites could run for electoral
office were the segregated Advisory Boards at the local level.
They were established under the aegis of white municipal
administrations in urban locations throughout the country
recognized in accord with the provisions of the Native Urban
Areas Act of 1923. The very small number of African males who
had established residence and met property and tax requirements
in these locations were eligible to stand for seats on the
Advisory Boards.
Eligibility for the vote in national, provincial, and
municipal elections, except in Cape Province, was restricted to
whites of both sexes -- (white women being granted the franchise
in 1930) . In Cape Province only black males were eligible -- but
then only if they met property, income, and literacy requirements
which excluded the overwhelming majority. Africans never were
more than a tiny minority of the Cape electorate. A slightly
larger number of Coloureds, concentrated in western Cape
Province, were registered. Asians, their population
overwhelmingly outside Cape Province, constituted only several
hundred of the voters' roll.
The passage of the Native Representation Act of 1936 was a
turning point. It removed Africans from the common national and
provincial voters' roll in Cape Province. Simultaneously, it
created new and expanded opportunities for African electoral
participation, both to elect African representatives and to elect
white representatives specifically designated to articulate
African concerns. Four 'Native' Senate seats were created
covering all provinces -- to be filled by whites only, elected
under a complicated formula of indirect election by African males
(see below). Nine Native Representative seats coverying all
provinces were also created for the new Native Representative
Council -- to be filled by Africans elected under the same
complicated formula of indirect voting (and an additional three
African representatives were to be chosen by the existing elected
African body in the Transkei). Three 'Native' parliamentary
seats and two 'Native' provincial seats were created in the Cape
Province for which only white candidates were eligible -- to be
elected by direct vote of African male electors on a separate
roll who met the pre-1936 franchise requirements. These new
segregated electoral arenas for Africans at the national and
provincial level, mixing indirect and direct voting, complemented
the existing segregated directly elected Advisory Boards arenas
for Africans at the local level.
Despite the uniquely racially segmented nature of the
diverse South African electoral arenas (which the CPSA did not
cease to critique), the party eventually opted to utilize all of
them -- albeit always in a limited number of selected
constituencies. Irregularly from 1929 through the late 1930s,
the CPSA tested its fortune with both white, Coloured, and
African candidates in selected national and local elections,
primarily in arenas where black voters comprised significant
minorities or in African-only constituencies. After the Nazi
attack upon the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and its shift to
support for the war effort, the party significantly stepped up
its electioneering. It did not abandon its previous activities
centered on African electoral arenas. But it also embarked upon
highly visible campaigns by white party members in white-only or
overwhelmingly white urban constituencies. White communists ran
unsuccessfully for parliament in the 1943 and 1948 general
elections and in selected Cape provincial elections. Its
unsuccessful national and provincial efforts were counterpointed
by partially successful campaigns, primarily by white party
members, for municipal council seats in Johannesburg, Cape Town,
East London, and Port Elizabeth. The party's most dramatic
successes came when it no longer held its few municipal seats in
predominantly white local level constituences, but after the
Nationalist Party parliamentary victory in May, 1948, when it
presented white candidates to the small number of African
electors in 'Native' seats in Western Cape. In November, 1948,
Sam Kahn was elected to parliament as 'Native' representative for
Western Cape and the following year Fred Carneson won a seat to
the provincial council representing African voters in the Western
Cape.
Recently Published Sources on CPSA Electioneering
In 1993 and 1994 four books have been published in South
Africa which throw light on several dimensions of CPSA electoral
activities from 1929 through the late 1940s. None of the books
focus primarily upon electioneering, but in each of them there
are sections devoted to campaigns and activities of communist
seekers of electoral office. One is a biography of a onetime
party candidate. Two others are by former longtime party
members, non-candidates, but directly involved in party
parliamentary campaigns. The fourth volume is by a non-South
African, never associated with the party.
One of these volumes has been published before; it is a
reissue of Edward Roux's 1944 biography of Sidney Bunting.3
Roux, a close associate of Roux at the time, devotes a full
chapter to Bunting's pathbreaking 1929 parliamentary campaign in
Tembuland in the Transkei. In the same chapter Roux also briefly
considers the parallel party campaign of Douglas Wolton for the
Cape Flats parliamentary seat.
The publication which contains the most information about
party electioneering is a biography of Hyman Basner, authored by
his second wife on the basis of an incomplete autobiography
written by Basner himself before his death in 1977.4 At various
points in the text Basner discusses his unsuccessful 1937
campaign as party standard bearer for the Transvaal-Orange Free
State 'Native' Senate seat (as well as his subsequent successful
1942 campaign for the same office) . There also are numerous
references to the parallel 1937 campaign of Edwin Mofutsanyana
for the Native Representative Council. The utility of the Basner
volume is further enhanced by the analytical introduction and
footnotes contributed by Tom Lodge.
The third volume is a memoir written in the early 1990s by
Pauline Podbrey, active in the party in Durban and Cape Town from
the late 1930s (although in exile she subsequently broke with
organized communism in the 1950s).5 Podbrey was primarily a
trade unionist, but her memoir provides a very brief vignette of
her experiences as a canvasser for Joey Faurie, who ran
unsuccessfully for the Cape Flats parliamentary seat, one of the
nine constituencies contested by the CPSA in the 1943 general
election.
The final volume, by Joshua Lazerson, an American historian,
provides information exclusively from a non-participant's
perspective.' As part of a broadly canvassed portrayal of white
anti-apartheid radicals, Lazerson considers the significance of
white communists running for municipal office, focusing upon
Hilda Watts Bernstein as a CPSA city councillor in Johannesburg
in the mid-l940s and upon Sam Kahn, first elected as a Cape Town
city councillor, and then subsequently as the first CPSA member
of parliament.
Roux on the CPSA'3 1929 Campaigns
The CPSA decision in early 1929 enter the parliamentary
lists came at time of high visibility for the party. Through
night schools for Africans, through trade union activity centered
in Johannesburg, and through meetings in townships stretching
from Potchefstroom to Vereeniging, the party's African membership
was rapidly expanding to several thousand, far exceeding the
white membership of several hundred. Although the party had
bitterly divided over the slogan of 'an independent Native
republic' imposed by the Comintern, the majority of the party
(including Bunting who had publicly opposed the slogan at the
Sixth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in mid-1928) agreed at
its January, 192 9, party conference to accept the slogan, with
its implications for a further concentration of party activity
on mobilization of support among Africans. The controversy over
the slogan had occasioned considerable publicity in the white
mainstream press, giving the party a heightened visibility to the
white public and government. In response to the government's
fears that the CPSA (and the disintegrating ICU) were posing new
threats to the established racial order, the government was
moving to strengthen the existing Riotous Assemblies Act of 1927
to give it new powers to suppress 'agitation' among the
'natives' . It was in this setting that the CPSA decided to
contest elections for the first time since its establishment in
1921.
Roux's account of the 1929 campaigns makes it clear that the
CPSA carefully targeted the Tembuland and Cape Flats
constituencies where black voters represented approximately half
of the electorate. The Cape Flats constituency, including both
African and Coloured voters (the latter much more numerous), was
actually considered more promising by virtue of the existence of
a party group in Ndabeni, a Cape Town African location within the
constituency. Deferring to the wish of Douglas Wolton, his
opponent in the intra-party struggle over the slogan of 'an
independent Native Republic', to contest the Cape Flats seat,
Bunting agreed to run in the vast Tembuland constituency.1 It
consisted of the rural reserve of the Transkei, without any
significant urban centers and where the party had no presence.
Bunting filed as an explicitly Communist Party candidate; Wolton
filed as an Independent for the Cape Flats seat. Bunting had
never visited the constituency which he contested and Wolton had
not primarily been engaged in work on the Cape Flats.
Quotations from Bunting's own reports, written during the
campaign in the Transkei, and sent to Johannesburg for
publication in the CPSA newspaper, South African Worker, provide
the bulk of Roux's account of the campaign.8 Bunting found the
official harassment and hostility of white voters which he had
anticipated. Five weeks of his three month stay in the Transkei
were taken up with arrests, court imposed restrictions, and court
appearances, but ultimately all charges were dropped on appeal.
He apparently made no effort to seek white votes and reported
that only two whites had behaved "decently" to him. He found the
Christian clergy especially reactionary. Nevertheless, Roux, his
wife, Rebecca, and Gana Makabeni, a Xhosa-speaking party member
and translator, travelled widely and conducted numerous meetings
for Africans. From the beginning Bunting was convinced that the
majority of unenfranchised Africans identified with his campaign.
He initially was hopeful that enfranchised Africans, consisting
mostly of "lawyers' clerks, teachers, recruiting clerks, etc. and
perhaps tend[ing] to consider themselves a superior caste" would
respond to his urging that they had "the duty of using their
'privilege' in trust for the whole of their people, and this we
hope most of them will do, secretly, though openly they may have
to kow-tow to their bosses".' Towards the end of the campaign,
however, he was more pessimistic, anticipating the outcome of the
election, when he observed: "Most voters I fear are good boys,
divorced from their people, so though the latter welcome us
overwhelmingly everywhere, they are voteless; the voters may vote
S.A.P. still".10 He was correct, as the S.A.P. candidate
garnered 1079 votes (46.2%), an Independent S.A.P. candidate
attracted 934 votes (40.0%), and Bunting received 289 votes
(12.4%), sufficient for him to receive back his election
deposit.11 In Roux's 1944 assessment Bunting's defeat was
nevertheless a personal victory, bringing the party for the first
time away from "the large towns and the smaller urban locations"
directly into the rural areas inhabited by the majority of
Africans.12
In the Cape Flats contest Roux wrote that, "things looked
well at first with Wolton leading a huge procession of residents
'of Ndabeni Location to demand reforms from the Cape Town city
council, but on election day the promised votes were not
forthcoming".13 Wolton finished third with only 93 votes
(3.0%), losing his election deposit as the S.A.P. candidate
garnered 1719 votes (54.8%) and the Nationalist Party candidate
1186 votes (37.8%)."
Basner on the 1937 Native Representative Campaigns
By 193S the CPSA had moved away from the ultra-left
sectarianism induced by the Comintern intervention of the early
1930s which had reduced its membership to several hundred,
primarily whites. It shifted to a united front policy which
encouraged approaches to potential allies outside the ranks of
the working class. While whites concentrated their extra-party
activism on trade unions and anti-fascist organizations, Africans
focused upon African national organizations,.
In 1935-36 prominent African party members joined Africans
of all political persuasions to oppose the Native Representation
Act, proposed in 1935 and passed in 1936. Yet even before the
Act was a fait accompli debate had begun among African
politicians and non-African leftists and radicals about an issue
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that would remain salient and contentious in black nationalist
and leftist circles through the 1980s: should black and leftist
candidates participate in segregated electoral institutions?
Basner's book provides useful information about debate over
boycott, both within the All-African Convention (AAC) and within
the CPSA. It is well known that the newly-created (AAC)
initially called for boycott, but reversed itself in mid-1936 to
endorse participation, both by voters and by candidates. Basner
claims that he urged participation already in 1935.l5 In 1936
he, in alliance with Edwin Mofutsanyana and J.B. Marks, persuaded
the party to participate in the elections in Transvaal/Orange
Free State constituencies. Mofutsanyana was nominated for one
of the three Transvaal/Orange Free State Native Representative
seats and Basner was nominated for the single Transvaal/Orange
Free State 'Native' representative. According to Basner'a
biography it was he,,not the party, who took the initiative in
putting himself forward as a party candidate, overcoming internal
party skepticism about his personal style and the vulnerability
of his most prominent opponent, J.D. Rheinallt Jones.16
Unlike Bunting and Wolton, both Mofutsanyana and Basner had
extensive experience in the constituencies where they were to
campaign. Mofutsanyana, (like Marks, who accompanied him and
Basner on a number of electioneering jaunts) had joined the party
in the Transvaal in the late 1920s and as a party functionary had
continued work in urban townships there and in the Orange Free
State after his return from a training course in Moscow in the
early 1930s. Unlike Mofutsanyana (and Bunting and Wolton) Basner
was not primarily engaged with party work. Nevertheless, he had
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uniquely appropriate qualifications as a white campaigning for
African votes. Since 1930 (three years before he joined the
party) the bulk of his legal practice had been in the black
community, not only in Johannesburg, but throughout the small
towns of Transvaal and Orange Free State. Among his clients were
chiefs, independent black churches, African teachers'
associations, traders, and burial societies, as well as clients
who sought him out to fight criminal charges and petty offenses
resulting under discriminatory legislation." He was also one
of the few party members who could meet the requirements for
white 'Native' representative candidates set by the legislation:
two year residency in the constituency and five hundred pounds
of freehold property.
The electoral terrain which Mofutsanyana and Basner faced
in their Transvaal/Orange Free State constitutencies was
substantially different from that which Bunting and Wolton had
faced eight years earlier. In 1929 the CPSA candidates were
competing directly for single votes from black and white voters
on a common roll in constituencies where black voters represented
roughly half of the electorate. The elections were held in Cape
Province with its tradition of African (and Coloured) voter
participation dating back to the nineteenth century, whereas
there was no African electoral tradition in Transvaal and Orange
Free State (with the limited exception of Advisory Board
elections in a limited number of urban locations after 1923).
In 1937, Basner (a white) and Mofutsanyana (an African) were
competing exclusively for African votes. Additionally, the
elections were not direct, but indirect, with large bloc votes
12
controlled by chiefs and local African rural councils in which
headmen played a prominent role, with the remaining small bloc
determined by urban location Advisory Boards. It was the latter
bloc which was crucial for Mofutsanyana, whose constituency
included only Advisory Boards.
According to Basner, he and Mofutsanyana, working together
with Marks, "knew how overwhelmingly the odds were against them",
yet "they were together... in believing that they might act as a
spur towards reviving the African National Congress, even if not
a popular ardour for Communism".18 Well aware that they faced
active hostility from white officialdom, they were determined to
utilise their official rights as candidates in order to reach
African areas otherwised closed to communists. Basner asserts
that they had a well calibrated strategy, which they adjusted in
the course of their campaigns.1' Initially they hoped to
persuade chiefs and rural councillors who would cast the
overwhelming majority of votes. They also targeted Advisory
Board members, hoping to win majorities of Advisory Boards to
cast their bloc votes, both for Mofutsanyana (whose only electors
were Advisory Board members) and for Basner (for whom Advisory
Board bloc votes were only a minority of those he needed to win).
Basner describes how, when meetings with chiefs were unpromising,
he revised his strategy to focus upon rural councillors and
Advisory Board members. In his speeches he emphasized national
issues, particularly land scarcity, while Mofutsanyana focused
upon the grievances of location dwellers.
In the first round of the election in March, 1937, Basner
finished second with 77,349 votes, sufficient to advance to the
13
final round. He was well ahead ofo>William Ballinger who received
only 4,757 votes, but a distant second behind J.D. Rheinhallt
Jones, the liberal candidate backed by the Joint Council Movement
and the Institute for Race Relations, who received 305,333 votes.
In the second and final round Basner was resoundingly defeated,
receiving 66,234 votes to 404,447 for Rheinallt Jones.
Mofutsanyana received insufficient votes in first round to become
one of the two finalists.
According to Basner, "the white Communist leadership was
both delighted and surprised, although they agreed for once with
the Trotskyists centred in the Cape, who ascribed the support for
Basner to his popularity as a lawyer".30 Five years later,
running against an incumbent Rheinallt Jones, Basner was
victorious. In 1942, however, Basner was not a party candidate,
having resigned in fall, 193 9, in protest against Soviet troops
attacking Finland. In 1942 the CPSA did not contest any of the
white 'Native' Senate or Cape 'Native' representative seats, thus
Basner's less-focused account of his successful 1942 campaign
cannot be utilized as an example of CPSA electioneering.
Podbrev as Canvasser in the 1943 Cape Flats Race
In 1943 the CPSA's fortune and acceptability had reached
unprecedented heights. Abandoning the anti-war stance which it
had adopted in September, 1939, after the June 22, 1941, Nazi
attack on the Soviet Union, the party broadened its activities
in all spheres. White and black party members stepped up trade
union activity, black party members actively participated in
efforts to make national organizations both more assertive and
supportive of the war, and white party members worked to make
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both trade unions and white political parties more open to
postwar socio-economic reform and greater racial tolerance. The
heroic Soviet war effort provoked both sympathy for the Soviet
Union and a new respectability for communism. By early 1944
party membership numbered 1500, four times the membership of
1940. Its recruits were drawn from all sections of the
population.
In an attempt to.further capitalize on the rising wave of
popularity, the CPSA decided to run parliamentary candidates in
a general election for the first time since 1929. In 1943,
however, in contrast to 1929, it concentrated on the white
electorate. Ultimately the party nominated nine candidates, five
in white-only constituencies (three in Johannesburg, one in
Springs, and one in Durban), and four in Cape Province
constituencies (three in Cape Town and one in East London) where
Coloured males, still eligible to vote on the common
parliamentary roll, comprised a minority of the voters. It
carefully, however, avoided constituencies allocated to the
Labour Party through its electoral pact with the United Party.
Cape Flats, where Douglas Wolton had run in 1929, was one
of the constitutencies the party chose to contest. In 1943 the
communist candidate was an Afrikaner woman trade unionist, Joey
Fourie. Pauline Podbrey, a trade unionist of Jewish origin, and
married to an Asian party member, served as one of her
canvassers. Her brief account of some of her electioneering
efforts conveys the hopes of the party and the challenges it
faced among the white electorate.21 Podbrey notes that both
Coloured farm laborers and Afrikaner farmers were targets of
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party canvassers like herself who "had no expectations of winning
the white vote but it was considered a good oppportunity to bring
our message to Afrikaners whom we would not otherwise meet". Met
by indifference, hostility, and even threats of physical
violence, she describes one encounter with an ailing Afrikaner
farmer in his sickbed whom she informed that the party wanted a
democratic republic free from foreign rule (without mentioning
the CPSA's commitment to votes for all). When he responded that
"'you Communists and we Afrikaners should join forces. Together
we could drive the kaffirs and the coolies and the Jews into the
sea'", Podbrey fled.22 In sharp contrast she reports a sense of
triumph after a well-attended election forum organized by the
party in the main meeting hall of the primarily English-speaking
upper middle class suburb' of Pinelands. Joey Fourie spoke and
Podbrey, in the chair, deftly fielded "relevant, intelligent and
not unfriendly" questions. At the conclusion of the meeting a-
vote of confidence was carried by a large majority. Assessing
the results of the party's efforts five decades later, Podbrey
commented, "as expected, we lost the election, but the campaign
had proved to be well worth the effort and the cost. We'd made
some friends and unblocked some prejudices".23
Although the total nationwide vote for the nine communist
candidates in the 1943 general election was 6808, merely 0.8% of
the total, in the Cape Flats constituency Joey Fourie captured
1165 votes (16.5%) against the winning United Party candidate who
received 4559 (65.5%) and an independent who received 1174
(16.9%). Her vote total and percentage were second among the
communist candidates, topped only by lawyer Harry Snitcher who
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received 1818 (27.7%) of the votes cast in., the Woodstock
constituency. George Sachs won 11.4% of the vote in Salt River,
the remaining Cape Town constituency contested by the CPSA.
Communist candidates in the other six races received from 4.4%
to 10.8% of the votes cast in their constituencies." The
average percentage of communist votes in the nine constituences
where they ran was 11.0%. The more than 10% difference between
the national percentage of 0.8% and the constituency average of
11.0% argues that the CPSA was successful in • targeting
constituencies where its prospects were deemed reasonable. That
party candidates did best in the three Cape Town constituencies
where Coloured voters were a significant minority of the
electorate suggests that the party may well have captured a good
proportion of their votes.
Lazerson on Communist Candidates in the 1940s
Like all of the four recent publications Lazerson's volume
is not primarily concerned with electoral politics. Whereas the
electioneering sections of the other three volumes primarily
consider electoral campaigns of unsuccessful communist candidates
running for office on the national level, Lazerson's nine page
section primarily considers the electioneering of communist
candidates for municipal office and then the performance of two
of the few victorious candidates. He devotes particular
attention to a consideration of how white communists, running in
white-only elections in Johannesburg, viewed the possibilities
of representation of African interests, both in their appeals to
the electorate and then, in the case of the successful
candidates, in their legislative activity.
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In assessing the main thrust
 ( of the discourse of the
communist candidates for the Johannesburg City Council, Lazerson
focuses upon the ambiguity of a non-racial socialist party
concentrating "the bulk of party energies and party press
attention on the arenas (Parliament, City Councils) that whites
alone contested".25 Drawing the bulk of his evidence from party
statements and reports of candidates in The Guardian, he
characterises the party's utilization of elections as a platform
"to publicize the party's existence, ideals and platform; to
propagandize for the Soviet Union, which many believed had
achieved a higher form of political, social, and economic
organization; and, of equal if not greater importance, to speak
for Africans and other disenfranchised blacks where they had no
voice of their own". He concludes that "there was a sense within
the party in the mid-1940s that the white public could be swayed
toward providing a more favorable dispensation for Africans".26
Lazerson continues his discussion by considering the role
of Hilda Watts Bernstein, who had joined the party in the late
1930s, during her three year term as Johannesburg's lone
communist city councillor from 1943 to 1947, a period covering
further Alexandra bus boycotts, vigorous squatter movements, and
various removal and influx control schemes supported by a
majority of the city council. In Lazerson's view, "the Africans
of Moroka and other Johannesburg townships would have been hard
pressed to find among any racial or ethnic group another
spokesperson as forthright and driven as Hilda Watts. Yet the
fact remained that she was not an elected African representative,
and as a white communist woman, she was anomaly in Johannesburg
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city government in the 1940s".27
He ends his assessment of communists involved in electoral
politics with an evaluation of Sam Kahn, a lawyer and party
member since 1932, who served both on the Cape Town City Council
and then, in 1948, became the party's first parliamentarian when
he won election as 'Native' Representative in the Western Cape
constituency. Lazerson asserts that "if the Cape Town branch of
the Communist Party had a counterpart to Hilda Watts, Sam Kahn
was that person".29
In his overall assessment of the white communist candidates
and elected officials Lazerson finds that the white communist
role of 'speaking for' was "problematic, particularly given that
whites were in visible and vocal roles" which made them
"vulnerable to charges of piracy, of attempting to take control
of, and direct, African and other nationally based
organizations".2' Notwithstanding, he concludes that the result
was a greatly changed communist party, whose white members
remained marginal in the larger white society, but, "as
proponents of equal rights, universal democracy, and integration,
communists were dangerous heretics who might well find a place
alongside or within the national organizations and so pose a
serious threat to the state".30
Common Themes and Questions
The assessments of CPSA electioneering offered in these four
recent publications, not surprisingly, agree that the enterprise,
whether in the 1920s, 1930s, or 1940s, was conducted against
great odds. They are also in agreement that, despite the few
electoral victories, the campaigns were worthwhile. The
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information presented has different, but overlapping, emphases.
Roux's account of Bunting's 1929 campaign and Basner's
account of his (and Mofutsanyana's) 1937 campaigns convey the
particular formidible obstacles which confronted party candidates
seeking African votes in overwhelmingly rural constituencies.
Both faced hostile white officials who challenged their right to
hold meetings. In both instances, they invoked electoral
regulations which permitted them as candidates to conduct
meetings which otherwise would have been illegal in African areas
under the control of white administrators.
Yet Roux's and Basner's accounts also reveal the slightly
different nature of the electoral arenas within which Bunting and
Basner were campaigning. They show how each tailored their
tactics accordingly and in keeping with their own distinctive
political resources.
Bunting ran for parliament in Cape Province before 1936 when
whites and Africans voted together directly for candidates. He
ran in an area where he had no previous experience. His account
highlights his conviction that he could expect no votes from
whites who comprised approximately half of the electorate and
that he became skeptical whether the other half of the
electorate, slightly more than one thousand African voters,
comprised of clerks, teachers, and low level government
employees, would vote for him. Nevertheless, he focused his
electioneering on meetings with the voteless African majority,
hoping that the African voters would cast their votes for him on
behalf of the unenfranchised (and utilizing the opportunity to
spread the party's message). Bunting's low vote total confirmed
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his assessment about the stance of the African voters in his
constituency.
Basner ran in an arena with only African voters, but under
a system of indirect voting dominated by chiefs and rural
councillors. Unlike Bunting, he brought to his campaign a rich
network of connections with traditional leaders and local traders
and teachers. He spent considerable effort initially courting
chiefs and rural councillors in direct meetings. Finding little
positive response, he shifted to meetings with the inhabitants
of locations in small dorps and with residents of urban
locations. He hoped that the former would influence the rural
councillors to cast their vote for him and that the latter would
persuade Advisory Board members to vote for him. Basner's
tactics produced sufficient votes to get him nominated in 1937,
but fell far short in the final election. Nevertheless, he had
devised tactics which paid off in 1942 when he won by attracting
sufficient votes from chiefs and others who had supported his
opponent in 1937. His campaign argued that well cultivated
networks among the African petty bourgeois could be translated
into an effective political resource even (or perhaps,
particularly) in a system of indirect voting.
Like Bunting and Basner, subsequent white CPSA campaigners
in overwhelmingly white rather than African or substantially
African constituences, also faced an uphill battle, of which they
readily recognized. Yet the contours of the electoral terrain
were different. Podbrey's antagonistic encounters with Afrikaner
farmers underlined the party's difficulties of penetrating the
electoral strongholds of Afrikaner nationalism. The accounts of
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Johannesburg candidates for city council in Lazerson's book
convey their strong belief that they had to deal with important
bread-and-butter local issues in the white urban constituences
where they ran. The accounts also indicate that the party was
well aware that popular white perceptions about the party's
stance on racial questions posed major obstacles to expanding its
electoral base, not only among Afrikaner farmers, but among
English-speaking city dwellers as well. Lazerson's accounts also
indicate how the party believed that in the wartime setting its
invocation of the Soviet Union could attract support. Podbrey's
warm memory of her apparently successful election meeting in
Pinelands suggests how the wartime party was able to gain entry
to middle class voters who previously might have been hostile.
It also illustrates how party members could interpret such
encounters as harbingers of potential future support.
Unfortunately, neither Podbrey's nor Lazerson's accounts
provide information analogous to that available in Roux's and
Basner's accounts about the tactics which the party pursued in
its campaigns in white urban areas in contests for parliament and
city council. Lazerson provides information about the discourse
of party literature, but this is not the same as the information
about on-the-ground tactics presented in Roux's book, and much
more vividly and extensively, in Basner's account.
Only in the 1940s, and then as an exception rather than as
a rule, was the party victorious in elections. Defeats were the
common outcome of CPSA electioneering. Yet Roux, (writing in
1944), Basner (writing in the 1970s), and Podbrey and Lazerson
(writing in the 1990s), all agree that the unsuccessful campaigns
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were beneficial to the party. In Roux's view Bunting's campaign
was not not only a personal triumph, but it brought the party
directly into African reserves for the first time. In Basner's
view the campaigns which he and Mofutsanyana conducted
contributed to efforts to revive the African National Congress.
Podbrey and Lazerson assess the unsuccessful campaigns in white
constituencies in terms of expanding the number of sympathizers
and carrying the party's message on democracy and equality to new
audiences in the white community. Lazerson also believes that
the white candidates,, and particularly successful candidates such
as Hilda Watts Bernstein and Sam Kahn, "acting as spokespersons
for blacks in the institutions of the dominant white culture,
gained near heroic status among Africans".31
The Utility of the Newly Published Sources
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the claims
made in the four recently published books. They do, however,
suggest that it is appropriate to consider further and more
systematically the electoral activity of the CPSA, particularly
from the late 1930s through the late 1940s when party candidates
were competing regularly in all the types of electoral arenas
which were open.
These books are particularly useful for information about
the two pre-1936 campaigns when communists competed for white and
African votes in the same arena (Roux), about the 1937 Native
Representative campaigns in segregated elections for Africans
alone (Basner), and about municipal elections for whites in
Johannesburg (Lazerson). But they provide only limited
information about two poles of major activity in the 1940s.
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Both Che Podbrey and Lazerson volumes give some information
about 1940s parliamentary electioneering in western Cape
Province. Yet there was more CPSA electioneering from the late
1930s onward in Cape Town than anywhere else, both in
parliamentary and provincial constituencies. New information
about it would be particularly welcome, particularly since it is
in the Cape Town area that the question of boycotts and electoral
participation became especially contentious. Also missing, and
more difficult to obtain, is additional information about the
remaining segmented electoral arena, that of the Advisory Boards,
in which communists competed. In the four recent publications
this topic is only discussed in passing, albeit very suggestively
by Lodge in the Basner book." The CPSA considered
participation in Advisory Boards useful." Party candidates did
compete, and often successfully, for Advisory Board seats in a
number of locations, particularly on the Witwatersrand. One of
the most useful sources about party activity in this electoral
arena, as well as the other electoral arenas in which the party
competed from the late 1930s onward, are the pages of Inkululeko
and The Guardian. It is time to return to them, and to other
party publications, including Freedom and party pamphlets, for
more systematic research. Yet new secondary sources,
particularly memoirs and studies like the four recently published
in South Africa, can also provide useful information. More of
them would be welcome.
24
ENDNOTES
1. H.J. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-
1950. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 580.
2. Tom Lodge, "Class Conflict, Communal Struggle and Patriotic
Unity: the Communist Party of South Africa during the Second
World War", African Studies Seminar Paper, University of the
Witwatersrand, 7 October 1985, p. 6.
3. Edward Roux, S.P. Bunting: A Political Biography. (Bellville:
Mayibuye Books, 1993). New edition introduced and edited by
Brian Bunting.
4. Miriam Basner, Am I An African?: The Political Memoirs of H.M.
Basner. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993).
With foreward and notes by Tom Lodge.
5. Pauline Podbrey, White Girl in Search of the Party.
(Pietermaritzburg: Hadeda Books, 1993).
6. Joshua N. Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle
Against Apartheid. (Bellville: Mayibuye Books, 1994).
7. Roux, S.P. Bunting, p. 135.
8. ibid, pp. 134-140.
9. ibid, p.136.
10. ibid, p. 138.
11. Vote tally and percentages from B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere
Verkiesings in Suid-Afrika 1910-1976. (Pretoria: Aktuele
Publikasies, 1977), p. 170.
12. Roux, S.P. Bunting, p. 135.
13. ibid, p. 139.
14. Vote tally and percentages from Schoeman, Parlementere
Verkiesings. p. 169.
15. Basner, Am I An African?. p. 64.
16. ibid, pp. 71, 77.
17. ibid, pp. 49-51, 71.
18. ibid, p. 81.
19. ibid, pp. 80-84, 89-91.
25
20. ibid, p. 92.
21. Podbrey, White Girl, p. 135-136.
22. ibid, pp. 135-136.
23. ibid, p. 136.
24. The vote tallies and the percentages are taken from Schoeman,
Parlementare Verkiesingg. pp. 254, 257-258, 262, 265-267, 269-
270.
25. Lazerson, Against the Tide, p. 34.
26. ibid, p. 36.
27. ibid, pp. 39-40.
28. ibid, p. 40.
29. iMd., p. 41.
30. ibid, p. 42.
31. ibid, p. 34.
32. Basner, Am I An African?, pp. xii, 200 (n. 7), 210 (n. 5).
33. For example, see the views of Moses Kotane as cited in Brian
Bunting, Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary. (London:
Inkululeko Publications, 1975), p. 139-140.
26
